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PLANT SHUTDOWNS AND TRANSFERS
INVOLVING Two UNIONS
By EDWIN S. KAHN*
INTRODUCTION
The runaway shop and the plant transfer have engaged the
attention of numerous commentators.' But there has been little or
no consideration of the problem in the context of an economically
motivated plant shutdown and transfer in a two-plant, two-union
situation. It is in this context that the present article is written.
The discussion is timely because of the increasing number and in-
creasing importance of cases involving plant transfers and such re-
lated areas as plant shutdowns2 and contracting-out?
Employees and unions have pursued their claims in a variety of
ways, and these will be discussed under the following headings:
I. FEDERAL CASES INVOLVING EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
II. ARBITRATION
III. THE DuTY TO BARGAIN AND THE NLRB
In order to focus the discussion to follow, the following hypothe-
tical situation is proposed, and will be referred to in the article:
The company operates two plants within one metropolitan area.
Plant A is an older plant and operations there are either unprofitable
or less profitable than the operations of Plant B, 12 miles away.
The company recognized a local of Union X as the bargaining agent
of Plant A about four years ago. A three-year contract expired
three months ago, and a new one-year contract was signed at the
expiration of the prior contract. Local 2 of Union Y was recog-
nized at Plant B two years ago. The company signed a three-year
contract with Local 2. Both plants manufacture the same products,
except that Plant A produces one product, comprising 20 per cent
of its output, which Plant B does not produce. No unique skills
are needed to manufacture that product. Both plants have an equal
number of employees. Both contracts include a broad management
rights clause, a plant-wide seniority system, and comparable wage
scales.
*Associate, Holland & Hart, Denver, Colorado. Member, Colorado Bar; B.A., cum
laude, University of Colorado, 1958; LL.B., cum laude, Harvard University, 1965.
This article reflects his own views and does not necessarily reflect the views of Holland
& Hart.
I E.g., Daykin, Run-Away Shops: The Problem and the Treatment, 12 LAB. L.J. 1025
(1961); Turner, Plant Removals and Related Problems, 13 LAB. L.J. 907 (1962);
Note, Labor Law Problems in Plant Relocation, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1100 (1964);
Note, Run-Away Shop-An Impediment to Peaceful Union Management Relations,
34 TEMP. L.Q. 136 (1961).
2 E.g., Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
3 E.g., Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
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One month ago, the Board of Directors decided to close down
Plant A in about six months. The one operation not now performed
by Plant B is to be transferred there. Plant B is also to be expanded
somewhat. The two changes will require the addition of a number
of employees equal to about one-third the number of employees
currently at Plant B. Thus, two-thirds of the employees at Plant A
will lose their jobs unless they have some recourse.
I. FEDERAL CASES INVOLVING EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
Individual employees and unions have frequently sought relief
in the federal courts. The jurisdictional basis for such claims is
Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act.4 Although
there had been uncertainty whether individual employees could sue
an employer under this section, the Supreme Court held in Smith
v. Evening News Ass'n5 that individual employees do have this
remedy.
In the two major cases to date involving the issue of the survival
of seniority rights upon a plant transfer, two courts of appeals have
come to differing conclusions. In Zdanok v. Glidden Co.," the Glid-
den Company had operated a plant at Elmhurst, New York, from
1929 until November 30, 1957. The company had regularly en-
tered into two-year collective agreements with the union. According
to its preamble, the latest contract was entered into by the company
"for and on behalf of its plant facilities located at Corona Avenue
and 94th Street, Elmhurst, Long Island, New York." The agreement
also contained various seniority clauses, including a statement that
any employee with more than five years of continuous service, in the
event of layoff, would be entitled to be re-employed if a suitable
461 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1965):
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organi-
zation representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizen-
ship of the parties.
5371 U.S. 195 (1962):
The concept that all suits to vindicate individual employee rights arising
from a collective bargaining contract should be excluded from the coverage
of § 301 has thus not survived. The rights of individual employees concern-
ing rates of pay and conditions of employment are a major focus of the
negotiation and administration of collective bargaining contracts. Individual
claims lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery, and are
to a large degree inevitably intertwined with union interests and many times
precipitate grave questions concerning the interpretation and enforceability
of the collective bargaining contract on which they are based. To exclude
these claims for the ambit of § 301 would stultify the congressional policy
of having the administration of collective bargaining contracts accomplished
under a uniform body of federal substantive law. This we are unwilling to
do. 371 U.S. at 200.
6288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted on the limited issue of the participation
of a Judge of the court of claims, 368 U.S. 814, alf'd on that issue, 370 U.S. 530.
petition for rehearing (including a petition for rehearing on a denial of certiorari on
the merits) denied, 371 U.S. 854 (1962).
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opening should occur within three years. In September, 1957, the
company announced that it would terminate the collective bargaining
contract at its expiration on November 30, 1957, and remove its
machinery and equipment to a newly established plant in Bethlehem,
Pennsylvania. The jobs of the employees at Elmhurst were then
terminated. The company offered to consider applications for
employment by its Elmhurst employees only if they came to Bethle-
hem and applied on the same basis as new applicants.
After a motion to stay arbitration proceedings had been granted
by a state court,7 the old employees brought a suit for damages,'
claiming that they should have been given new jobs at Bethlehem
with full seniority. On appeal from a decision denying relief, it was
held by the court of appeals, in a split decision, that the plaintiffs
possessed seniority rights which should have been recognized by the
defendant at its new location. The contract clause providing re-
employment rights for a three-year period suggested to the court
that seniority rights were to survive the agreement. Moreover,
Judge Madden of the Court of Claims, whose participation was
affirmed by the Supreme Court,' writing for the majority, said that
the employees had worked on the assumption that they had "ac-
quired" seniority rights and held that the seniority rights could be
considered to have "vested" and could not be unilaterally annulled.
He interpreted the clause specifying the location of the plant as
'nothing more than a reference to the existing situation" and held
that the "reasonable expectations" of the employees must prevail
over the clause." Chief Justice Lumbard's dissent emphasized that
seniority rights arise only by virtue of contract and concluded that
the agreement here did not confer such rights on the employees in
seeking work at the new location." Other employees of Glidden then
consolidated an action previously begun with Zdanok, 2 and that
case once more found its way to the Second Circuit. The court held
that the second action was determined by the first under the doctrine
of collateral estoppel and refused to hear additional evidence which
the company tried to introduce."
7Matter of General Warehousemen's Union, 10 Misc. 2d 700, 172 N.Y.S.2d 678
(Sup. Ct. 1958).
8 185 F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
9 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. granted on the limited issue of the participation
of a Judge of the court of claims, 368 U.S. 814, a! 'd on that issue, 370 U.S. 530,
petition for rehearing (including a petition for rehearing on a denial of certiorari on
the merits) denied, 371 U.S. 854 (1962).
10 288 F.2d at 103-04.
1 Id. at 105.
12 For an early criticism of the Zdanok decision, see Aaron, Reflections on Legal Nature
and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1532, 1552-54 (1962).
13 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
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Caught between the Sixth Circuit's contrary decision in Oddie
v. Ross Gear & Tool Co."4 and the force of the doctrine of res judi-
cata, Judge Friendly, writing for the majority said:
What the Oddie ruling does create, particularly when it is
superimposed on Chief Judge Lumbard's earlier dissent here and the
great amount of critical discussion in the law reviews that our deci-
sion has engendered, is doubt whether, if other similar contracts
should come before us for construction, we ought follow the lead
of our divided decision in this case or of the unanimous contrary
one of the Sixth Circuit in Oddie. This is precisely the situation
in which "the law of the case" is decisive; in Judge Magruder's
words, "mere doubt on our part is not enough to open up the point
for full reconsideration."'
15
However, Chief Judge Lumbard, in a concurring opinion, said:
I should like to point out that, while the law of these specific
cases is settled . . .the prior decision rendered by this court, ...
in fact represents the views of but one Judge Waterman of this
circuit and is entitled to no precedential value so far as this circuit
is concerned. The two judges of this circuit who heard the first
appeal were divided on the appropriate disposition of the case.
As for the merits of these cases, whatever substance there may
have been in the plaintiffs' position on the first appeal, had it been
proper for the district court to consider the additional proof adduced
by the defendant at the second trial it seems to me to be clear beyond
the peradventure of a doubt that the defendant proffered the only
tenable view of the collective bargaining agreement. 16
Thus, if a similar case arose once more in the Second Circuit,
it is highly doubtful that it would be decided the same way as
Zdanok.
In Oddie v. Ross Gear & Tool Co.," the company moved its
entire Detroit division to Tennessee. The recognition clause in the
agreement provided that the company recognize the union as "exclu-
sive representative of its employees in its plant or plants which are
located in that portion of the greater Detroit area which is located
within the city limits of Detroit .... lThe union discussed the trans-
fer with the company, but after getting no satisfaction from it, sev-
eral employees filed a complaint under section 301. The court held:
The collective bargaining agreement provides that the Company
recognize the Union as the exclusive representative ... [as stated
above]. This is plain, unambiguous language. The agreement gave
seniority and recall-to-work rights to employees in the defendant's
plants which were within the city limits of Detroit. It gave no such
rights to employees of a plant in Tennessee. * * * It is true, as
the District Judge pointed out, that the plant in Tennessee has the
same machinery and equipment, the same officers and supervisors,
14 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.), cert. denied; 371 U.S. 941 (1962).
15 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
'ld. at 957.
17 305 F.2d 143 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 941 (1962).
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and the same operation, but, as also stated by him, it is a "new
climate," which of course recognizes that it is not in the city limits
of Detroit, but in Tennessee. Whether it would be advisable or
reasonable under the existing circumstances to have the agreement
apply to the plant in Tennessee is not for the court to decide. We
must construe the contract as it is written, rather than make a new
contract for the parties.
18
The court also rejected the "vested" rights theory embraced in
Zdanok. It stated the issue in terms of what rights the union had
under the express provisions of the agreement as to the location of
the plant, rather than whether the relocation cut off any rights it
may have had. It found that no rights upon relocation had been
created by the agreement and, therefore, that none were cut off.
There was some prior bargaining history which indicated that
the union was aware that the company might move, but not that it
might move to Tennessee. In addition, Odie may be distinguished
from the fact situation postulated in the Introduction to this discus-
sion, in that the union responded weakly to the company notice
concerning the move.
However, there are highly signifcant factors in the hypothetical
situation which point to the same result as in Oddie: the limitation
of seniority to the plant; the broad mangement functions clause;
limitation of recognition to the plant; and the absence of an explicit
carry-over of seniority rights beyond the term of the agreement
(there was such a carry-over in Zdanok). However, neither Zdanok
nor Oddie involved an existing two-plant, two-union situation. In
each case, the company shut down an existing plant and established
a new plant at a new location. There is no way of predicting with
certainty whether the Zdanok doctrine of vested seniority rights
would be applied by the Second Circuit to the two-union situation.
Apart from the weakness of Zdanok precedent noted earlier, the
court might hesitate to take this further step because of the difficulty
of the two groups of employees. Just as the courts often leave ques-
tions for Congress, 9 so the courts might be tempted to leave this
decision to the processes of arbitration" or collective bargaining."'
An existing two-plant situation was before the court in Fraser
v. Magic Chef-Food Giant Markets Inc.22 The company's Cleveland
I8 1d. at 148.
19 E.g., United Steelworkers v. Bouligny, 86 Sup. Ct. 272 (1965). For an illuminating
discussion of "The Paradox of Making Law by Refusing to Make Law," see Hart &
Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law,
Problem 18, 515-46 (Mimeo. ed. 1958).
20 Arbitrators have no one to whom to pass the buck once they determine the issue is
arbitrable. The arbitration decisions are discussed in Part II, in/ra.
21 The duty to bargain is discussed in Part III, in/ra.
2324 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1963).
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plant manufactured commercial cooking equipment and its St. Louis
plant produced oil and gas-based heaters. The company previously
had closed some of its other plants. It closed the Cleveland plant
about one year after signing a three-year agreement with the union.
The court did not state whether the St. Louis plant was unionized.
Affirming the district court's award of summary judgment for the
company the court held that in the absence of specific language in
the agreement to the contrary, management's right to close a plant
cannot be limited.2
The federal district courts, in situations where the decision to
move has been economically motivated, generally have also followed
Oddie and held that seniority rights do not carry over. In Slenzka
v. Hoover Ball Bearing Co.,24 the recognition clause of the agree-
ment provided that it was binding if any existing operations were
moved within a 60-mile radius. The company closed its old plant
and established a new plant more than 60 miles away. The court
granted the company's motion for judgment on the pleadings. In
one recent case, the court refused to grant summary judgment for
the employer.'5 The union had alleged violation of specific clauses
and implied covenants in the agreement; it had also alleged that the
company's divisional president had promised that the plant would
not be moved during the term of the agreement,"5 a factor which
may make the case distinguishable from Oddie and Fraser.
Although the majority of the cases in federal courts are suits
for money damages, on occasion unions have sought injunctive re-
lief to delay transfers pending arbitration. In Local Div. 1098 v.
Eastern Greyhound Lines, 7 the union was successful in obtaining
a preliminary injunction to halt the transfer of the company's repair
and maintenance facilities until the completion of arbitration pro-
ceedings. The court noted that there would be only a few weeks'
delay in the move as a result of the injunction. In similar cases,
23Id. at 856:
Rights of employees under a collective bargaining agreement presuppose an
employer-employee relationship. A collective bargaining agreement, in ordi-
nary usage and terminology, does not create an employer-employee relation-
ship nor does it guarantee the continuance of one. Employees' rights under
such a contract do not survive discontinuance of business and a termination
of operations. 324 F.2d at 856.
24 215 F. Supp. 761 (N.D. Ohio 1963).
25UAW v. Avis Industrial Corp., 56 L.R.R.M. 2632, 50 CCH Lab. Cas. { 3l9S (E.D.
Mich. 1964).
2 Cf. Penzien v. Dielectric Prods, Eng'r Co., 3741 Mich. 444, 132 N.W.2d 130, cert.
denied, 86 Sup. Ct. 73 (1965), in which the court held employees not entitled to
severance pay upon a plant closing as a matter of law although the contract provided
in the event of close down, severance pay would be subject to immediate negotiation.
27 225 F. Supp. 28 (D.D.C. 1963).
VOL. 43
PLANT SHUTDOWNS AND TRANSFERS
courts have either flatly refused injunctive relief' or have condi-
tioned the refusal on the posting of a bond by the employer as
security for the employees' recovery should they win the arbitration
proceeding.'
Considering the foregoing cases, it can be seen that the pre-
vailing federal case law is that employees generally have no right
to damages or to carry-over seniority or other rights in plant transfer
situations in the absence of specific language in the contract to the
contrary." Thus, the union or the employees justifiably could con-
clude that in the hypothetical situation postulated earlier, the fed-
eral courts are not a particularly favorable forum. Faced as they
are with the lack of substantive relief in the courts, and the pro-
cedural barrier which may be invoked,31 it is not surprising that
unions and employees often turn first to arbitration in pursuit of
their claims.
II. ARBITRATION
Once the arbitration proceeding is invoked, the threshold ques-
tion is whether the dispute is or is not arbitrable. Arbitrators have
generally held disputes over plant transfers to be arbitrable." One
notable exception is Remington Rand Univac Division.3 Remington
Rand had operated three plants at Ilion, New York, and one plant
in Utica, New York, located about ten miles away. Two different
unions were certified for the two areas and union shop agreements
were in effect. Management decided to close two of the three Ilion
plants and move portions of the operations to Utica. Three months
after the company had announced the move, the union filed a griev-
2American Workers v. Liberty Baking Co., 242 F. Supp. 238 (W.D. Pa. 1965).
2Auto Workers v. Seagrave Division, 56 L.R.R.M. 2874, 50 CCH Lab. Cas. 1 31991
(E.D. Ohio 1964).
30 For a case in which shut-down coincided with the expiration of the contract, see
Woody v. Sterling Aluminum Prods., 243 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
31 A court may refuse to take jurisdiction on the merits until the union has pursued its
arbitration rights if the contract requires arbitration. Cf. United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); and Carey v. Westinghouse, 375
U.S. 261 (1964). The rationale for such ruling is akin to the policy underlying
doctrines of the exhaustion of administrative remedies, Myers v. Bethlehem Ship-
building Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). See also DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREAT-
ISE, §§ 20.01-.10 '(1958). For primary jurisdiction, see Sovern, Section 301 and the
Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARv. L. REV. 529 (1963). Such a policy is
in line with the analysis that courts, legislatures, and administrative bodies serve
primarily to review private nongovernmental decisions, rather than to make them in
the first instance, Hart & Sacks, supra note 19, at 6-9.
32 In United Steelworkers v. Warrier & Gulf Nav. Co., supra note 31, the Supreme Court
issued a direction to the lower federal courts of which most arbitrators are aware:
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts
should be resolved in favor of coverage. 363 U.S. at 582-83.
3341 Lab. Arb. 321 (1963). Accord, Philco Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 604 (1963).
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ance. One month later, it filed unfair labor practice charges. The
arbitrator held the dispute not arbitrable in these words:
The most careful study of the facts ...reveals that there are
substantive differences between the present case and those to which
the affirmed legal principles apply. First, the Warrior and Gulf
Navigation Co. case . . . constituted no invitation to arbitrators to
favor their authority on capricious grounds. There had to be some
concrete, relevant contract references to justify arbitrability. In the
instant case, the Union has mentioned clauses (recognition, check-
off, general working conditions) but it is not demonstrated to the
arbitrator's satisfaction that the Company action involves directly
the "interpretation and application" of these clauses. In this con-
nection it is very pertinent that the Union has not attacked the
Company's basic right to move certain of its operations to Utica
nor has it cited (nor could it cite) any clause to challenge such
right.
34
Once the threshold of arbitrability has been crossed, the out-
come of the case seems to turn primarily on the geographical limits
of the recognition clause in the agreement. Implicit in rulings based
on this factor is the belief that employee rights with respect to
plant transfers can be negotiated and embodied in the agreement
as are other employee rights. Thus, the majority of the recently arbi-
trated cases have held that employees have no carry-over rights in
plant transfer situation. 5
However, arbitrators have upheld employee work or seniority
rights in a few instances when the contract contained specific lan-
guage barring the transfer of factories," or existing work,37 when
two plants were within the area covered by one bargaining agree-
ment,38 and when the same union represented employees at both
plants and the employer has expressed willingness to have employees
transferred.39 When seniority rights are held to carry over, the usual
remedy is to slot seniority on a case-by-case basis.4
One reason for the prevailing doctrine of no carry-over of
seniority may be the difficulty of reconciling "vested rights" of
34 Id. at 327.
35 Marsh Wall Prods., 45 Lab. Arb. 551 (1965) ; Empire Textile Corp., 44 Lab. Arb.
979 (1965); Crown Cork & Seal, 43 Lab. Arb. 1264 (1964); Paragon Bridge &
Steel Co., 44 Lab. Arb. 361 (1965) ; Curtiss-Wright Corp., 43 Lab. Arb. 5 (1964);
Metal Textile Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 107 (1964); Sivyer Steel Casting Co., 39 Lab.
Arb. 449 (1962); H. H. Robertson Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 928 (1962); Armco Steel
Corp., 36 Lab. Arb. 981 (1961).
36 Sidele Fashions, Inc., 36 Lab. Arb. 1364 (1961).
3 7 White Motor Co., 43 Lab. Arb. 517 (1964).
38 Superior Prods. Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 517 (1964).
9 Sonotone Corp., 42 Lab. Arb. 359 (1964).
4 Compare Sonotone Corp., supra note 39 with Superior Prods., 42 Lab. Arb. 359
(1964). Slotting generally means the integration or dovetailing of two seniority
lists, with the resulting rank of an employee usually dependent on his time with the
company, rather than time at a particular plant.
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the employees of Plant A with the divesting of rights of employees
at Plant B. In other words, slotting seniority or "bumping" em-
ployees formerly at the plant which was shut down (Plant A) gen-
erally violates the spirit and probably the letter of the Plant B con-
tract. The situation probably is even more difficult to resolve when
two different unions are involved.4'
An arbitrator's decision on the merits is generally conclusive.
The decision will bar suits by dissatisfied employees under section
301.42 It will be enforced on a motion for summary judgment,
3
even if the arbitrator's decision is debatable or the underlying con-
tract clause is arguably void or unenforceable."
The arbitrator's focus on the wording of the agreement, as the
essential starting point, seems correct.4'5 The simplest decision on
the merits for an arbitrator would occur if there were a specific
clause governing plant transfers. As can be seen from this review
of the cases, however, such a clause rarely exists. The next step in
the arbitrator's decisional process is generally to look at the breadth
of the recognition clause. A narrow recognition clause limited to
the plant, and often the specific company division involved, usually
limits the applicability of the agreement to the particular plant in-
volved and precludes plant transfer rights.46 This conclusion seems
correct, especially if the contract contains a broad management rights
clause, as postulated earlier.
The primary protection for employees, therefore, would seem
to be in aggressive union bargaining for the inclusion of a work
or plant transfer clause in the contract. In the absence of such a
contractual provision, neither litigation nor arbitration will often
protect employees in plant transfer situations. Nor does the exis-
tence of the duty to bargain generally portend much relief, as will
appear in the next part of this article.
III. THE Dur T'O BARGAIN
Although the NLRB has tended to hold that an employer must
41 Furthermore, it is highly doubtful that an arbitrator appointed to interpret Contract A
has either the jurisdiction to interpret Contract B or the authority to issue an order
so directly affecting Plant B.
0 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1965); Panza v. Arinco Steel Corp.,
208 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Pa. 1962), affd, 316 F.2d 69 '(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 897 (1963).
43 Amalgamated Meat Cutter v. M. Feder & Co., 234 F. Supp. 564 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
4Selb Mfg. Co. v. IAM, 305 F.2d 177 (8th Cir. 1962).
4 5See generally, Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482
(1959).
46 E.g., United Packers, Inc., 38 Lab. Arb. 619 (1962).
1966
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
bargain"7 with the union over the decision to go out of business,'
in the area of transfer of operations it is only required that manage-
ment bargain about the effects of the change but not about the
making of the decision itself. 9
Several courts of appeals have held that an employer is under
no duty to bargain with respect to economically motivated decisions
to shut down," transfer operations,5' or subcontract operations,"2
although the employer has a duty to bargain about the effects of
the decision."
Although the Supreme Court recently ruled that the contracting
out of existing work is a mandatory subject of bargaining," it was
careful to limit the holding to the facts of that case."5 In view of
the Court's limiting language," and the factors it considered im-
portant,5" it is doubtful that the holding will be extended to cover
plant transfers generally.' There is a sharp contrast between the
hypothetical situation postulated earlier and the facts in Fibreboard.
For example, in the postulated situation, there is a change in the
basic operation of the company, only some of the work which has
been performed will continue to be performed, and it will be done
at another plant, capital investment is involved, and it is probable
that the number of employees involved will differ.
As noted earlier,59 it has been clearly established that the em-
ployer has a duty to bargain about the effects of the decision to
shut down." Nevertheless, despite the limited holding of the Su-
preme Court in Fibreboard, the NLRB has since ruled that an em-
4 7 The employer's duty is enunciated in § 8(a)(5), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)'(5) (1965).
48 Star Baby Co., 140 NLRB 678 (1963), modified to remove the board order on this point
sub nom, NLRB v. Neiderman, 334 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1964). The Supreme Court
has since ruled that an employer may cease business in a one-plant situation for anti-
union as well as economic reasons without a duty to bargain over the decision itself.
Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 270 (1965).
49 R.C. Can Co., 144 NLRB 210 (1963), enforced on this issue sub nom, NLRB v.
R.C. Can Co., 340 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1965).
50 NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955).
5 1 NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
53 Jay Foods, Inc., v. NLRB, 292 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961).
53 NLRB v. Rapid Bindery, Inc., 293 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1961).
54 Fibreboard Paper Products v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
5Id. at 215.
66 Ibid.
1#7 No change in the basic operations of the company, performance of the work in the
same plant, no new capital investment, and a mere replacement of existing employees
with those of an independent cotractor to do the same work. Id. at 213.
58 For discussion of how far the duty to bargain with respect to the decision to move
should extend, see Note, Labor Law Problems in Plant iReocailn, 77 HAV. L. REV.
1100, 1104-05 (1964).
5 Note 53, supra.
60 Cf. Order of R. R. Tel. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 362 U.S. 330 (1960).
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ployer has a duty to bargain over the decision to transfer or shut
down a plant." That ruling has been reversed,62 however, and the
series of cases which have held that there is no duty to bargain over
the economically motivated decision to shut down or transfer has
been strengthened. 3
The actual result of the duty to bargain about the effects of a
transfer has been that employers have negotiated about severance
pay and related issues, but generally have not negotiated for a carry-
over of seniority rights. Despite the fact that the employer is re-
quired to bargain in good faith on such matters, there is no duty
to reach an agreement. 4 The economic power of the union Linder
such circumstances is relatively meaningless, since the failure of
the parties to agree leaves it with little recourse. The union has
no really effective tactic available.
If six months have passed since the union was notified of the
decision to shut down, it is too late for the union to file an unfair
labor practice charge with the NLRB.6" Even if a timely charge
were filed and upheld, the net result would be that the employer
would be compelled to bargain in good faith, but not to reach agree-
ment. By this time, the plant would probably be closed, and the eco-
nomic power of the union would be ineffectual.
If, after notice, the union felt that it was not achieving any-
thing at the bargaining table, it could strike.6 But such a move pre-
sumably would only accelerate the close down, and the employer
would be entitled to replace economic strikers for as long as neces-
sary. 7 Thus, the duty to bargain over the effects of the shut-down
61 Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 148 NLRB 545 (1964), modified only on another
issue, 152 NLRB No. 76 (1965).
6NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1965).
63 The court's language on the issue is reminiscent of the failing company exception
to the limitations on mergers:
We conclude that an employer faced with an economic necessity of
either moving or consolidating the operations of a Jailing business has no
duty to bargain with the union respecting its decision to shut down. Id. at
196. (Emphasis added.)
But whether operations at a particular plant are unprofitable or simply less prc fitable
than they would be elsewhere does not seem enough of a difference to justify ho!ding
the employer to a duty to bargain with respect to the decision to shut down in the
latter case though not the former. On the failing company exception in antitrust
law, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962) (dictum).
64 NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 403 (1952) (dictum).
5White Consol. Indus., Inc., 154 NLRB No. 127 (1965).
6 The relevance of a no-strike clause in the situation is beyond the scope of this article.
67 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). If the strike were an
unfair labor practice strike, the traditional backpay award would be meaningful. but
reinstatement probably is meaningless unless the employer's failure to bargain in good
faith infected the decision to shut down so that it would be held to have been moti-
vated by antiunion bias, rather than economic considerations. In the latter case, the
NLRB might order reinstatement at the operating plant. Textile Workers V. Darling-
ton Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275 (1965).
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offers as little hope for the carry-over of seniority and other rights
as does a section 301 action or arbitration."3
CONCLUSION
In the absence of specific contract language preserving work
and seniority rights, the current status of the law gives the union
and the employees little hope of preserving such rights at other
plants. The only effective way to secure such rights is for the
union to bargain for them when negotiating an agreement prior to
the employer's decision to close down or transfer. An alternative
and probably less effective tactic would be to bargain for broad
recognition and seniority clauses and narrow management rights
clauses. In view of the fact that unions have been fairly aggressive
in bargaining to preserve work and seniority rights in the light of
automation," it is somewhat surprising that they have been less
aggressive in bargaining for such rights in plant transfer situations.
Leaving the parties to settle the issues at the bargaining table is
the general method for the settlement of such issues, and is appro-
priate in this situation.
68 Parts I and II, supra.
6The agreements reached with the West Coast International Longshoremen's Associ-
ation and the New York Newspaper Employees Unions illustrate this fact.
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